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Explaining the Perseverance of
"Independence in Europe": Strategic
Reinforcements of Minority Nationalist
Pro-Europeanism
Judith Sijstermans
University of California, Berkeley

Abstract
In the 1980’s minority nationalist parties adopted a policy of “independence in Europe.” Paradoxically, the policy simultaneously advocated conceding powers to a supranational body and taking back powers from the state. EU regional development programs
initially spurred these pro-European policies, but these programs have since failed. Given
the EU incentives, why do minority nationalist parties remain pro-European? I test a bottom-up, party political theory and use the British case studies of the Scottish National Party
and the Welsh nationalist party, Plaid Cymru. I argue that these parties have remained proEuropean because they are small oppositional parties. As small oppositional parties, minority
nationalist parties have unique strategic mechanisms that incentivize policy inertia. These
mechanisms are: (1) the continuity and dominance of party leadership in making EU policy,
(2) underdeveloped policy positions, and (3) the importance of transnational coalitions. Implications include the possibility that as minority nationalist parties grow in size and power,
they might alter their European position to suit changing strategic considerations.
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Introduction
“Scotland’s Future—Independence in Europe” dominates the front page of a 1990
Scottish National Party pamphlet. After decades of anti-European rhetoric, the Scottish National Party voted at a party conference in 1983 to support the European Community and
the new slogan placed the pro-European policy at the center of SNP ideology. Today, the
SNP’s pro-European position remains unchanged. Deputy leader Nicola Sturgeon pledged
Scotland would be a “proud and constructive partner in the European family” upon independence (Johnson, 2013). Since the 1980’s, sustained pro-Europeanism has been a pattern
in minority nationalist1 parties across Europe.
At the time that pro-European policies developed, the Europe of the Regions model
created a hospitable environment for minority nationalists by valuing the input of sub-state
regions and local authorities. Minority nationalist parties enjoyed the “pincer effect” as they
squeezed state power locally and at the EU level (Lynch, 1996, p. 14). The 1980’s were
also relatively hospitable for the European Union among mainstream parties. However,
domestic and EU contexts have changed dramatically. Both mainstream Europhilia and the
Europe of the Regions have faded over the past 30 years. Most positions in the Council of
Ministers and European Commission are still dominated by parties in government and exclude regional powers (Elias, 2008). A “growing discrepancy between ‘regional’ priorities”
hindered regional lobbying at the European Union (Rowe, 2011, p. 8). In conjunction with
lack of regional unity, “national governments proved themselves to be highly adept at acting
as ‘gatekeepers’” (Elias, 2008, p. 486).2 Domestically, “increased Euroscepticism has been
the corollary of increased integration” (Taggart, 1998, p. 363).
Given the failure of the Europe of the Regions and increased Euroscepticism, why
have minority nationalist parties remained pro-European? Minority nationalist parties have
remained pro-European because they are small and oppositional. The characteristics of small
and oppositional parties that incentivize them to remain pro-European are: (1) the dominance and continuity of party leadership on EU policy, (2) the underdeveloped nature of
EU policy, and (3) the importance of transnational coalitions. Before elaborating upon these
mechanisms, I will explain this paper’s structure.
My second section briefly explains and evaluates an existing top-down theory of the
relationship between Europe and minority nationalist parties. The previous literature is split
into two approaches: the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach. The first model
focuses on how the EU fostered support in regions through the Europe of the Regions
model and relies on the Europeanization concept of party-EU relations. In the third section, I review the bottom up literature and describe my own party political methodology.
To explain this methodology, I define “minority nationalist” and “small and oppositional.”
In section four, I present the argument for my specific theory that small and oppositional strategies of minority nationalist parties allow them to remain pro-European. This
argument has three subsections echoing the mechanisms of small and oppositional strategy:
dominance of leaders in EU policy, underdeveloped policies, and transnational coalitions.
In the concluding section, I note the limitations of my argument, namely my restricted case
1  Minority nationalism is “the denial of exclusive claims on the part of the state nationalism and the assertion
of national rights of self-determination for groups within it” (Keating 2001, 18). More definitions are included
on page 6.
2  For more on the failure of the Europe of the Regions, see Loughlin (1996) and Hepburn (2008).
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study and definitional difficulties. These limitations reveal important implications as some
minority nationalist parties grow. Before looking forward, I look back at the existing literature on minority nationalists and the EU.
The Top Down Approach: Examining and Evaluating Previous Theories
The top-down group of literature, led by the early work of Michael Keating, pinpoints
the Europe of the Regions concept as a major motivation for minority nationalist parties. This model allowed them to bypass their traditional enemy, the state (Keating, 1995).
When faced with the development of a European Union, minority nationalists responded
to it with their most dominant and well developed interest—the “autonomy goal” (Hoppe,
2007). Politically, the autonomy goal was furthered by the EU taking away power from
the state. Economically, the Common Market nurtured stronger regional economies (Karolewski, 2007; Keating, 1995).
This top-down approach is framed by the process of Europeanization. Europeanization is a process in which European integration influences domestic political parties, electoral systems and policy. European integration is the independent variable, while political
parties are dependent (Kulahci, 2012, p. 1). In this sense, the centrally European led initiatives of the Europe of the Regions—including the Committee of the Regions—can be
seen as methods by which the European Union incorporates and influences political parties.
Especially in relation to smaller parties, the EU is seen as the major actor and the initiator of
contact. Europeanization is the first model that we can identify to explain our question and
it suggests that minority nationalists became pro-European in response to EU-led incentives.
Although Europeanization may explain the initial shift towards pro-Europeanism, it is
less applicable to current minority nationalist parties because European top-down influence
on minority nationalist parties has been minimal. It has been more minimal than mainstream
parties because minority nationalists are not ruling parties and the regional outreach of the
1990’s has died down. The party political literature begins to provide another explanation.
In contrast to the Europeanization model, my argument suggests that minority nationalist
party pro-Europeanism is underpinned by their own strategic behaviors, not those of the
EU.
A Party Political Approach: Previous Literature, Terminology and Methodology
The party political literature focuses on the internal structure of minority nationalist
parties and their strategic behavior using the EU as a tool. It challenges the idea that nationalism alone causes pro-Europeanism. In the Welsh Plaid Cymru and the Galician Bloque
Nacionalista Galego (BNG), “strategic and tactical considerations exerted a growing pressure on what position was formally espoused vis-a-vis the EU” (Elias, 2008, p. 577). Elias
suggested an internal angle was necessary in understanding EU positions. Carolyn Rowe’s
book (2011) focuses on representations in Europe and shows that regional goals go beyond
nationalism. Janet Laible’s book (2008) complements Rowe’s research by showing that
minority nationalist Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) use the European Parliament to criticize the norm, gain valuable resources, and engage on issues that are domestically important.
Although party political authors begin to argue that parties act strategically, they do not
suggest what specific strategy might influence them. They focus on many diverse EU strategies but don’t identify an overarching strategic characteristic. These authors have also been
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limited by the need to prove that the top-down approach is not appropriate. This leaves less
room for alternative explanations.
In order to present a clear strategic argument, I must first clarify the definition of
minority nationalism. Then I substantiate the two foundational arguments: minority nationalists are pro-European and minority nationalists are small and oppositional. These foundational arguments will build up to my argument: minority nationalists have remained proEuropean because they are small and oppositional.
Definition of Minority Nationalist
Minority nationalism is “the denial of exclusive claims on the part of the state nationalism and the assertion of national rights of self-determination for groups within it” (Keating,
1996, p. 18). Minority nationalist groups seek autonomy outside of state structures. Minority nationalism has been substituted with the term “regionalism.” I do not use regionalism
because it is not significantly different from “minority nationalism,” yet it is unpopular
within the parties. Regionalism promotes the territorial, cultural, and political identities of
a region but does not strive for a separate state (Karolewski, 2007, p. 32). The only difference with minority nationalism is that nationalists seek independence. However, minority
nationalist parties oscillate between separatism and more autonomy depending on domestic
strategy. Plaid Cymru leader Leanne Wood said, “Plaid Cymru wants an independent Wales
within the European Union …but in order to get there, there are a number of posts along
the way” so the party does not formally call for an independence referendum (Torrance,
2012). PC exemplifies how regionalists are minority nationalists who may have more posts
to go along the way. Additionally, “nationalist” is what parties tend to call themselves.
Definition of Small and Oppositional
Minority nationalist parties are small and oppositional in relation to the state because
the state has ultimate authority over EU relations. Minority nationalists are oppositional
because they run only in their specific region of a state. They could only come into government as a minority party in a coalition but even this rarely occurs as their representation
tends to be so miniscule in relation to the state. As a result of regional limitations, membership also remains small compared to state parties. For example, the SNP has the most members in Scotland (approximately 25,000), but this is small compared to the 134,000 member
Conservative Party (Gardham, 2013; Dominiczak, 2013). Given these limitations, minority
nationalists can always be seen as “small” and “oppositional” in the EU context. By pinning
down the definitions of minority nationalism and by characterizing the parties further, I
can focus on how small and oppositional characteristics foster and protect pro-Europeanism.
Case Study Selection
My research will focus on one country, the United Kingdom. This reduces the risk
of country specific intervening variables that can complicate analyses (Kulahci, 2012, p.
7). The UK is a useful case study because it has multiple developed parties and devolution
which allows regional data and news to be disaggregated. My UK case study focuses on two
parties: the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru (PC). Both the SNP and PC
became pro-European in the 1980’s and have held that position for the last 30 years. Instead
of a multi-country study, I compile intraparty, domestic, and European strategies and argue
that these might be united under one single strategic concern. The SNP and PC are diverse
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2014/iss1/13
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choices. The SNP has a majority in the Scottish Parliament and is soon voting on independence. PC is the third largest party in the National Assembly for Wales with regionalist
goals. Despite differences, both utilize small and oppositional strategies.
I exclude Northern Irish nationalists because their nationalism is not minority nationalism. Irish nationalists want to rejoin Ireland, not become independent, and Irish nationalism is tied to sectarianism. Despite this exception, the pattern is not isolated. Strategic
considerations can be generalized across small oppositional parties. The case studies illustrate
these general truths.
Minority Nationalist Party Strategy towards Europe as Small and Oppositional
Given the failure of the Europe of the Regions and the Euroscepticism of the British
political system, why have minority nationalist parties in the UK remained pro-European?
Minority nationalist parties have remained pro-European because of their unique strategic
concerns as small and oppositional parties. Small and oppositional strategic mechanisms that
allow them to remain pro-European are: (1) the dominance and continuity of party leadership on EU policy, (2) the underdeveloped nature of EU policy, and (3) the importance
of transnational coalitions. By connecting these concepts and focusing on the mechanisms
that drive the connection, I highlight how size and positioning foster pro-European policy
inertia. In the following three subsections, I analyze each mechanism in turn.
The Continuity and Dominance of Party Leadership on European Union Policy
Small parties have more policy continuity between leaders and police internal dissent
more strongly than mainstream parties which protects pro-European policies despite contextual changes.
Policy continuity between leaders
Leadership in small parties tends to be more united and less contested. Much of the
EU policy continuity within minority nationalist parties is determined by agreement and
stability between party leaders. I trace the leadership continuity in two ways: by tracing
rhetorical continuity between leaders and by comparing leadership elections between small
and large parties.
The SNP’s pro-European rhetoric has been passed down from leader to leader since
Gordon Wilson pioneered it in the 1980’s. During the 1983 conference, “the SNP leader,
Gordon Wilson, proposed a more positive approach towards the EC…Wilson started to
advance the idea that European membership would have helped Scotland to withdraw from
the British Union without suffering any kind of economic disadvantage” (Tarditi, 2010,
p. 14). Wilson also argued that, “an independent Scotland could reap the same substantial
economic benefits enjoyed by other small sovereign Community members, such as Denmark…[he talked] enthusiastically of opening Scottish trade offices in all European capitals”
(Bradley, 1988). A decade later, the SNP’s frame of the EU’s benefits remained economic.
The 1997 SNP manifesto focused on the economic security the EU provides for pensions,
agriculture, and fisheries (SNP 1997 Manifesto, p. 14, 23, 25, 26). The 2011 manifesto
promises to make Scotland “Europe’s green energy powerhouse” and to use EU funds to
improve employability and education training (SNP 2011 Manifesto, p. 10, 12, 34, 36).
Current party leaders echo Wilson’s calls of a Nordic relationship to the European Union.
Member of the European Parliament Alyn Smith said to a Welsh audience, “Our people,
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in Scotland and Wales, have already started down a different path. In our Parliament and
your Senedd, proportional, coalition, minority governments! How European, how Nordic
specifically. We have a different set of values…Those values fit into a social democratic
Nordic Europe” (Smith, 2007).
Alex Salmond’s SNP led Scottish Government focuses on driving foreign investment
and his ministers lead trade missions throughout Europe, just as Wilson envisioned. The
SNP led government established institutions like Scotland’s Exchange, which promotes
networking between Scots abroad, and expanded the Scottish Development International
offices (SNP Manifesto 2011, p. 29). “The Scottish Government’s key international priority
for 2013 and 2014 is to increase the level of engagement with the European Union and its
member countries” and the 2014-2015 Draft Budget notes economic priorities are European events, EU wide renewable energy and creative industry partnerships across Europe
(Scottish Government, 2013, p. 39; 108) focus on proactive economic engagement was
initiated by the SNP’s Government and echoes Wilsons hope of increased trade across Europe. The 2003 Labour-led budget focused on obtaining funds not on proactive economic
engagement (Scottish Government, April 2002). Thus, Gordon Wilson’s strategic view of
the European Union as a platform for economic engagement remains a central SNP strategy
for Europe today.
Europeanism is a policy that has been passed down through Welsh nationalism since
the 1920’s. PC founding father Saunders Lewis’s “Europeanist ideas would shape Plaid
Cymru’s constitutional thinking for generations to come. An alternative agenda of cooperative small nation politics within a broader international context would become deeply
ingrained in Plaid Cymru’s political mindset” (Elias, 2013, p. 48). At a speech to the 2014
spring party conference, Plaid Cymru MEP Jill Evans said, “We gain from Europe, but we
contribute to her as well. We are a modern, bilingual European nation. We can teach other
countries as well as learn from them. What we need to build is an equal partnership” (Evans, 2014). Evans expressed the distinct Welsh angle of pro-Europeanism that portrays the
relationship between Wales and Europe as a “cooperative” space and a “partnership. ” This
understanding of Wales’s relationship to the EU has passed from leader to leader.
Pro-European policy continuity between leaders is more likely in small parties because
their leadership elections have been less contested and less controversial. Scottish National
Party leadership elections have been won overwhelmingly since pro-Europeanism emerged
in 1990. Alex Salmond won the 1990 election 486 to 186. Even though there was “a
known preference of his parliamentary colleagues and Gordon Wilson” for his opponent,
the overwhelming vote made him a clear successor (Chittenden, 1990). Salmond’s eventual
successor, John Swinney, followed his gradualist approach and is now a key figure in Salmond’s Scottish Government. Swinney comfortably won the leadership post 547 to 268 in
2000 and 577 to 111 in 2004 despite what was seen as a divisive and potentially devastating
internal battle between “gradualists” and “fundamentalists” (Quinn, 2012, Appendix G).
Finally, Alex Salmond won the 2007 leadership election with 76 % of the vote and has led
unopposed since (Quinn, 2012, Table G.1). In Plaid Cymru, Ieuan Wyn Jones won the
leadership by 50.7 per cent of the vote in 2003 and remained leader for 9 years until he
stood down (Quinn, 2012, Appendix H). In a two round election in 2012, Leanne Wood
became Plaid Cymru leader with 57 % of the vote (Morris, 2012).
In contrast, larger parties’ leadership elections had more contenders and were less decisive. The Labour Party’s 2010 election had five candidates and the election needed four
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2014/iss1/13
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stages before a leader was decided. In the fourth stage, Ed Miliband won with only 50.65 %
of the vote. His win was much more tenuous considering he trailed David Miliband for the
first three rounds (Kelly, Lester, & Durkin, 2010, p. 15). Early on, David Cameron faced
strong competition from Liam Fox and David Davis. Ultimately, Cameron lost the vote
among Conservative Members of Parliament. Among MPs, he won 28.3 %, Davis won 31.3
% and Fox won 21.2 %. In addition to having weak elite support, he only received 45.5 %
of the members’ votes. Before the party’s conference, Cameron had only 17 % support from
party members. During the election, he had to match his policies to better suit their needs
and this radicalized his European policy (Quinn, 2012, p. 113).
Cameron’s situation shows how leadership elections drive leaders’ policy positions to
be more distinct from their predecessors and more radical. Cameron had to “firm up his
Eurosceptic credentials during the campaign” (Quinn, 2012, p. 118; Temko, 2005). The
Daily Telegraph noted that “Cameron woos the right with an attack on Europe” and one
Tory MP pressured him to be more clear with his policy, stating, “he can’t carry on being
all things to all men forever” (Trefgame, Jones, & Sparrow, 2005; Brady & Barnes, 2005).
The SNP elite actively avoided this situation. When Alex Salmond chose to run in 2007, his
biggest competition, Nicola Sturgeon, stepped down. Current Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill also stepped down to allow Sturgeon to run for Deputy First Minister on Salmond’s
ticket. The lack of strong opposition and the ability to compromise behind closed doors
allows small party leaders to face less policy criticism and thus, are not pressured to change
the policy positions of their predecessors.
Strong consequences for dissent
Minority nationalist parties are more likely to crack down upon internal dissent because as a small party they are less able to withstand internal fissures. Since the 1980’s,
potentially divisive conversations have been suppressed so the EU remains exclusively an
elite policy area. These biases against internal conflict allow party leaders to make EU policy
unilaterally and strengthen pro-European policy continuity.
Recent conflicts within the Scottish National Party splintered the party and taught
membership and leadership that conflict is best avoided. The best example of this is the
1982 expulsion of the socialist SNP organization the 1979 Group, which included many
current leaders. Recently, Gordon Wilson said the traumatic expulsion of the 79 Group was
necessary for the unity of the party and “history has proved him to be correct. Perhaps it’s
the memory of that bitter time that ensures that the modern SNP are so disciplined” (The
Herald, February 2014). In fact, by the late 1980’s the SNP had unified again. By then the
party was finally “dedicating itself to achievement of a significant breakthrough and not allowing emergence of self-imposed obstacles” (Wilson, 1989). More recently, comparing the
North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO) debate in the SNP to recent backbench revolts
on Europe in the Conservative Party exemplifies how much stronger aversion to internal
dissent is within smaller parties.
Policy change on NATO was brought in from above, introduced and championed by
MP Angus Robertson. Robertson’s policy change led to a close vote at the party’s 2012 autumn conference with the leadership ultimately prevailing as the motion passed 426 to 332
(BBC News 2012). The strong reaction by media and those within the party shows how
important internal coherence is to the SNP. The NATO debate was framed as “an internal
rebellion” by the media (Daily Record, October, 2012; Johnson, 2012). To combat this
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rhetoric, SNP leaders were quick to assure each other and voters that unity was premium.
In his opening words of the conference Alex Salmond reminded the party, “I trust this conference to operate in the best interests of achieving independence for Scotland. I trust this
conference to debate the big issues in a comradely manner” (Salmond, 2012). Leaders also
activated personal influence in their membership by calling on the support of well-respected
former leaders like Winnie Ewing and by using party resources to distribute pamphlets
throughout the party (Robertson, 2012).
The most serious result of the debate was the disaffiliation of Members of Scottish
Parliament (MSPs) Jean Urquhart and John Finnie from the party. Their defection was
portrayed the “near disappearance of [Alex Salmond’s] majority in the parliament - he now
has 65 of the 129 MSPs” (Swanson, 2012). However, most of the dozen MSPs who had
been against changing NATO policy fell into line with the decision. In fact, within the
party, the mood after the debate ultimately felt self-congratulatory. Salmond echoed this
feeling by commenting: “We had an excellent and democratic debate at party conference
last Friday, and agreed a policy of reaffirming our opposition to nuclear weapons as a nonnuclear member of the NATO alliance - a position that will be accepted by the party as a
whole” (BBC News, October 2012). The result reaffirmed that on policy, “Salmond has
been trusted with a long leash” by his party’s own membership (Massie, 2012).
A general lack of interest in the EU reduces the impetus to overcome policy inertia
and elite leadership. British public opinion on the EU can be generalized as “widespread
indifference or uncertainty” (Usherwood, 2002, p. 216-219). The persistent lack of interest
means that there is no strong grassroots impetus to internal conflict. To some extent, elite
leadership within minority nationalist parties follows society wide elite leadership on Europe
but elite leaders in small parties are more consistent (Hellstrom, 2008). Stewart Maxwell
MSP confirmed that, “because there is a settled position, it’s the senior party members who
deal with the EU. In terms of what the party does, it’s a few senior members of the party
who drive the changes” (S. Maxwell, personal communication, January 8, 2014). EU policy
has remained the same in minority nationalist parties because of the closer connections between these senior members and because unity is viewed as indispensable.
Underdeveloped and Broad Policy
Small and oppositional party policies are more likely to be underdeveloped, especially
on foreign affairs. Broad EU policy encourages minority nationalist parties to maintain proEuropean policy through two mechanisms: their reliance on Euro-enthusiasts for detailed
decisions and the oppositional usefulness of broad pro-European rhetoric.
Lack of resources
A lack of resources reduces funding for small parties’ European policy and campaigning. Capital in smaller parties will almost always be more difficult to come by as a result
of fewer membership fees and less reputational pull with big sources of funding. I measure
spending on European policy through European Parliament campaign spending. Campaign
spending provides a useful measurement because spending during that time indicates the
amount of importance parties put on the European Union as a policy arena. Not only do
small parties have less money, they spend a smaller proportion of money on European issues
when compared to regional elections. This can be seen in Table 1 in the appendix. It is not
strategically valuable for a small, oppositional party to fight with the same intensity in each
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2014/iss1/13
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race. A Plaid Cymru party member explains: “Plaid Cymru is never going to be in power
in Westminster…we’re the main opposition party in the Assembly and only Assembly elections will bring us self-determination” (Elias, 2013, p. 73).
This relative lack of spending on Europe affects policy through lack of spending on
manifestos in small parties. According to the Electoral Commission party spending reports,
in the 2009 European Parliament election, the SNP spent 1762 pounds, PC spent 840
pounds and the Scottish Green Party spent 120 pounds on manifestos. The Conservative
Party spent 870 pounds in Scotland and 1773 pounds in Wales, but overall the party spent
11, 197 pounds. The benefits from huge resources overall to develop policy at a national
level that can then be used in devolved regions. Thus, the SNP’s spending on EP manifestos
is on par with mainstream parties but when taking into account the mainstream spending
across the UK, they are massively over powered by larger parties. Small party policy development is also constrained because they lack access to the European Commission and
bureaucracy. Most EU institutions remain state-led. This may reduce small party knowledge
of EU issues even if they might attempt to engage. While UK ministers are obliged to be
present when devolved leaders communicate with the EU they are not obliged to inform
Scottish or Welsh leaders of their communications.
How does a lack of monetary and informational resources maintain pro-European
policy? Fewer resources to spend on manifesto writing and policy development mean that
expert staff on Europe are a small group of people (MEPs and their staff) within the party
who will tend to have some affiliation or innate interest in Europe. Additionally, there are
fewer MEPs—Plaid Cymru has one (Jill Evans) and the Scottish National Party has two
(Alyn Smith, Ian Hudghton) compared to the 26 of the Conservative Party. As a result of
the small number of MEPs and the lack of resources spent on European policy, small parties
rely on more narrow feedback from the European Parliament. Alyn Smith MEP explained,
“We will to some extent take our line from the Scottish Government and where there isn’t
a line we help to create a line.” (A. Smith, personal communication, January 10, 2014).
Smith’s liaison to the Scottish Parliament Paul Togneri added, “Our MEPs have a larger
role in ensuring that the party knows what’s happening in Europe and that the party hierarchy knows what’s going on” (P. Togneri, personal communication, January 15, 2014).
MEPs in larger parties are much less likely to have this type of bottom up policy making
influence because this would be too difficult to coordinate. Additionally, “when a party is
in government, it could be damaging if its MEPs voted against what the government had
agreed upon in the Council of Ministers or in the European Council” (Raunio, 2000, p.
218). Raunio’s empirical analysis and surveys of parties’ attitudes towards MEPs proves that
“regarding party size, the effect is as expected, with MEPs being more influential in smaller
parties” (Raunio, 2000, p. 220).
The influence of MEPs drives policy to become more pro-European because, “one
of the consequences of the varying expertise in the European area within or among the
political parties, especially those whose Euro-enthusiasm is cool, is that those individuals in
the parties who do have specialist knowledge…will gain influence in the party in this area
because of their rare knowledge and will invariably be Euro enthusiasts” (Gaffney, 1996).
As a result of their reliance on MEPs and European Parliament (EP) staff as informational
and policy making figures, small parties European policies will be biased towards Euroenthusiasm.
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Broad policy as an oppositional tool
Another reason that small party leaders detail only limited aspects of European Union
policy is that it is strategically useful. Small parties are oppositional and thus by remaining
broadly pro-European in a Eurosceptic party system they’re able to criticize most of the
mainstream party positions on Europe. A review of minority nationalist press releases shows
the oppositional nature of their EU policies.
The parties use the EU to criticize the UK government and governing parties for
shunning the EU and also for incorporating EU policies. The SNP criticizes “internationally
isolated Westminster, as Labour and the Tories both move towards an in/out referendum”
and claims this isolationism is bad for business (Scottish National Party, January 2013; Scottish National Party, November 2013). On the other hand they oppose the government’s
integration of EU policy on various issues including fisheries, agriculture and animal welfare. When mainstream parties do incorporate EU policy, the SNP suggests that they do
not stand up for Scotland. One such claim is that “successive Labour and Tory government
failure to stand up for our fishing industry in Europe has been a disgrace” (Scottish National
Party, April 2009). MEP Ian Hudghton attacked the “London-led Labour and Lib Dems
support [for] an attempted ban on trawling in the Atlantic, a move which would have had
a devastating effect on the Scottish industry” (Greens-EFA, October 2013). Plaid Cymru
portrays their own EU policy as “putting Wales first” and accuse mainstream parties of forgetting Wales. MEP Jill Evans suggests that “time after time we’ve seen the Labour Welsh
government and the Tory UK government failing Wales, over transport routes and, most
recently, over flooding” (Plaid Cymru, March 2014). Mainstream party Euroscepticism is
portrayed as “petty point-scoring” and “posturing by London based political parties” (Plaid
Cymru, May 2013). They portray Euroscepticism not as rejection of the EU but rather as
a more basic dichotomy, claiming that “the advantages of EU membership far outweigh
the alternative – isolationism.” Thus PC far outweighs the alternative choice—mainstream
Eurosceptics (Evans speech, October 2013).
The SNP and PC take advantage of the fact that they cannot negotiate with the European Union by using opposition on the EU to bring up wider issues against mainstream
parties. This behavior by oppositional parties is in line with the idea that, “the pivotal actor
in electoral contests is not necessarily always the median voter…it may be optimal for executives in some institutional and strategic settings to target a narrow group of voters (e.g.,
voters in swing districts or partisan voters), whereas other contexts may encourage governments to represent broader electoral interests” (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008, p. 312).
Since public attention to the details of EU policy is low, oppositional parties do not necessarily need to follow public opinion. Rather, they co-opt the issue of the EU to “represent
broader electoral interests,” namely anti-government stances. Broad pro-European policies
benefit small parties by providing a rhetorical way to express anti-mainstream policies and
they also allow day to day policy decisions to be made by natural Euro enthusiasts—those
already in Brussels.
The Importance and Benefits of Transnational Coalitions
Small, oppositional parties rely on transnational relationships at the EU level for monetary and reputational capital. Notably, these connections are generated horizontally—between parties—and not vertically like funding benefits of the Europe of the Regions.
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Resources gains at the European Union
Small parties gain funding for staff and policy development through the European Parliament. Each Member of Parliament has a staff and services budget of €21, 209 per month
which can be used to employ assistants in Brussels and in their constituency. Small parties
tend to make these staff budgets go further and share these budgets with national parliamentarians so staffing budget benefits the party’s domestic popularity. For example, SNP
MEP Ian Hudghton employs 7 assistants, in full and in part. By partly employing assistants,
Hudghton and fellow SNP MEP Alyn Smith share staff part time with MSPs who pay for
them part time as well. In this way and also through sharing office costs, European Parliament budgets benefit the SNP domestically too. In general, small party MEPs employ more
staff than mainstream parties. Plaid Cymru MEP Jill Evans employs six assistants, United
Kingdom Independence Party leader Nigel Farage employs five assistants and Green MEP
Jean Lambert employs 12. An average Conservative MEP has 4 assistants.3 Just as they focus
their campaigning budgets on regional elections, minority nationalist MEPs spread their
staffing budgets to add value at their main arena of focus—regional parliaments.
More benefits are accessed through party coalitions. Minority nationalist and Green
parties have coalesced into the Greens-European Free Alliance (EFA) Party Group. European Parliament party groups receive their own funding separate from MEPs allowances.
Mainly “the material benefits of being in a group include more office space and staff, and
more money for organising meetings and distributing information” (Miller, 2009, p. 5). The
SNP use the Greens-EFA Group to employ an SNP expert on fisheries policy who serves
the whole group but provides European policy support to the SNP in particular. They
gain more resources for their domestic priority—fisheries—but party groups also provide
broader informational resources to process EU developments which can be difficult with
few resources. Through the Greens-EFA Group, SNP MEPs gain the policy expertise of
other parties across Europe. The Scottish MEPs “work very closely with the Greens. They
have advisors who are looking at detailed consequences of the complete legislative package
and then our advisors will look over what the Green group advisors nail it down to and we
will look at the effects for Scotland separately. Then we see if we should vote along with the
group depending on how it affects Scotland” (Togneri interview, 2014).
This information sharing within party coalitions also allows small party MEPs to better
inform leaders, which is a main responsibility and source of leaders strategic information.
The European Free Alliance defines itself as “a pro-European party that endorses the European Union’s values” and the Green Party also sees the EU as instrumental in environmental
protection (EFA website, “About Us”; Greens-EFA website, “History”). Small party MEPs’
lack of resources necessitates reliance on their party groups for help processing information.
This information is passed on to leaders who rely on their MEPs for European expertise.
Through this informational chain, the pro-Europeanism of the Greens-EFA group maintains minority nationalist pro-Europeanism. Even without the Euro enthusiast informational
bias, the aid in processing EU developments encourages minority nationalists to maintain
strong European connections.

3 All assistant numbers based on the European Parliament’s register, available at http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/meps/en/assistants.html.
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Reputational gains at the European Union
Even more than resources, reputation is an important strategic concern for small parties who struggle to legitimate themselves in the domestic media. BBC archives “suggest
that online news coverage is distorted in favor of the three largest parties, particularly Conservative and Labour. With the exceptions of the Greens and Respect, Labour and the
Conservatives generally have about 10 times as many mentions in news stories as the other
parties” (Ward, 2008, p. 142). Although the SNP was mentioned with the same frequency
as the Liberal Democrats on BBC news, they still trailed by over 100 articles to the Conservatives and Labour. Plaid Cymru fared even worse, having only 40 news articles to their
main regional competitor Labour’s 347 articles (Ward, 2008, Table 7.1, p. 143). Small parties struggle to challenge this lack of media coverage domestically because they are seen as
perpetually oppositional. The SNP attempted to do so by mounting a legal challenge against
the BBC for excluding Alex Salmond from leadership debates. However, “critics pointed
out the SNP was not a UK party – it now has only six out of 650 Westminster seats – and it
had no hope of becoming the government. Salmond was also standing down as an MP and
had no prospect of becoming prime minister” (Carrell, 2010). Thus minority nationalists
struggle to gain media attention domestically due to their regional limitations.
Europe can provide a solution to this lack of coverage and legitimacy. The European
Parliament has a much better reputation than Europe as a whole. In fact, 52 % of Europeans
feel that the Parliament should have a larger role and only 22 % feel it should have a reduced
role (Parlemeter, February 2011). By linking party leadership with the European Parliament, small parties signal to the public that they are competent. Only 25 per cent of people
trust their national parliament, while 31 % trust the European Parliament (Eurobarometer,
December 2013).
One way small parties capitalize on the trust in the European Parliament is to nominate
party leadership to become MEPs. As MEPs, they can represent the party with the legitimacy of the European Union. SNP MEPs Winnie Ewing and Ian Hudghton both served
as party presidents, and MEP Allan MacCartney was deputy leader of the party. Alyn Smith
said, “We [the SNP] have the European angle front and center” including a permanent
MEP position on the party’s decision making body, the National Executive Committee
(Smith interview, January 2014). Plaid Cymru MEP Jill Evans served as President until
2013. Many parties have an EU representative on the executive committee but “in larger
parties, usually only the leaders of the EP delegation are members of the executive organs”
(Raunio, 2000, p. 213). In small parties, the EU representatives are at the highest and most
central levels of party decision making.
Small party MEPs use EU power to draw attention to the most important domestic
issues but they need their transnational connections to do so. Transnational party political groups also provide procedural advantages like appointments to committees, allocating
speaking time, and helping EU agenda setting (Miller, 2009, p. 6). Committee assignments
are more important for small parties because they usually have a very limited EU policy
focus that is specific to local lobbies and thus their specific policy interests might be very
narrow. For example the SNP’s Ian Hudghton is on the fisheries committee, which is a
major issue in Scotland. Jill Evans is on the Environmental Committee which allows her to
speak authoritatively on renewable energy, which Party leader Leanne Wood promoted as
the party’s mechanism for growing the Welsh economy (Wood, 2012). Having some real
influence on the most pressing issues in their constituency allows MEPs to back up their
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2014/iss1/13
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rhetoric that they “fought for” their constituency despite only having one or two MEPs in
their party. Minority nationalists would be unable to do this through the state so it’s very
important that they gain positions at the EP to suit their domestic needs. Transnational
coalitions ensure this.
Smaller parties also use their EU relationships to draw positive attention. This was visible at the Scottish March for Independence in 2013, where “50 to 60 Flemish nationalist
campaigners from the Vlaamse Volksbeweging (VVB) coalition were distributing leaflets
to promote that march and a pan-European initiative to get one million signatures on a
petition for self-determination sent in to the European Commission” (Carrell, 2013). Scottish success provided a rallying point and opportunity for Flemish nationalists to promote
themselves and to seek validation. PC MEP Jill Evans also relied on other minority nationalist parties in speeches to legitimize Plaid Cymru’s plans. She noted transnational policy
inspirations from economic plans in the Basque Country, the Peace Institute models of the
Flemish, and the peaceful civic nationalist movement of the SNP (Evans, October 2013;
Evans, November 2009). To justify their ability to change policies in Wales, Leanne Wood
claimed that Plaid Cymru could be a government that “protects Welsh pensioners from
cuts in council tax benefit by doing a deal with local government - like the one reached in
Scotland – rather than simply acting as the Tories’ henchmen” (Wood, September 2012).
Capitalizing on Scottish connections indicates to the public that Plaid Cymru’s policies are
legitimate and well tested, which is more important for them because they have never been
in government.
Forming transnational coalitions enables minority nationalist MEPs to draw attention
to the issues they care about, to call attention to more successful parties, to increase staffing
numbers which disseminates the benefits of European engagement throughout membership.
Conclusion
Given the failure of the Europe of the Regions and the Euroscepticism of the British
political system, why have minority nationalist parties remained pro-European? Minority
nationalists have remained pro-European because of the characteristics intrinsic to small and
oppositional parties, namely: (1) the dominance and continuity of party leadership on EU
policy, (2) the underdeveloped nature of EU policy, and (3) the importance of transnational
coalitions.
Before discussing these characteristics I reviewed previous approaches to the relationship between minority nationalists and Europe. The more developed of these approaches
is the top-down approach but this approach became outdated. The bottom-up literature
provides an updated, party political angle. This literature’s contention that “strategic and
tactical considerations exerted a growing pressure on what position was formally espoused
vis-a-vis the EU” in minority nationalist parties was a foundational idea of this paper (Elias,
2008, p. 577).
The strategic considerations that have allowed minority nationalist parties to remain
pro-European are those of small and oppositional parties. The small and oppositional mechanisms that maintain pro-Europeanism are a dominance of leadership in EU policymaking, a
broadly oppositional EU policy, and transnational benefits. These characteristics encourage
pro-European policy inertia by reducing incentives to develop detailed or new EU policy,
providing strong oppositional uses of the EU and providing resource and reputational benefits. Notably I showed the influence of minority nationalist leaders on their party’s EU
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positions is not dependent on their nationalism but rather on small party structures that
champion unilateral leadership and strategic oppositional positions to attack mainstream
party competitors.
Limitations of Argument and Implications for the Future
These findings are limited by a small case study and definitional difficulties. However,
my argument should not be seen in isolation but rather as a complement to broader work.
Limiting my case study enabled a deeper look within parties and allowed me to examine the
way that parties act at all levels of governance without having to explain differences between
countries. Using a solely UK study may hinder generalizability. However, it adds depth of
knowledge and information in a field with a wealth of multi-country comparisons through
the work of Anwen Elias (2008), Carolyn Rowe (2011), Janet Laible (2008), Jurgen-Klaus
Nagel (2004) and Michael Keating (1995, 2005, 2008).
In order to focus on party strategy, my definitions take nationalism and European integration as constant. This is ultimately not limiting because EU positions are shown to be a
function of strategy not EU changes or nationalist ideology. Defining minority nationalists
as small and oppositional could be questioned in light of growing Scottish and Catalonian
parties. However, I would suggest that the rise of some minority nationalist parties is an opportunity to examine further implications. I will do so using the SNP as a case study. In light
of my argument, the SNP’s growth should reduce pro-European policy.
Although my claim that they are small and oppositional remains true at the state level,
in devolved government the SNP is no longer in opposition. The Scottish Government
and Parliament have had an SNP majority since 2011. This majority enabled their efforts
to take advantage of devolution by seeking more power within the European Union. They
have tried to take some negotiating powers, which have been traditionally reserved to states.
Their change in positioning seems to have had some effect on their pro-Europeanism but
any significant policy change has been hindered by lack of real governing power and the
availability of the UK Government as a rhetorical scapegoat.
For example, the Scottish Government works with the European Commission on
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), through the Cabinet Secretary for Rural Affairs and the
Environment Richard Lochhead. This has changed their small and oppositional strategy in
two ways. First, Lochhead relies on Scottish Government civil servants to provide information on fisheries so informational responsibility is removed from the Euro-enthusiast experts
within the party and in Brussels. As such, the SNP has developed a clear and detailed policy
proposal on fisheries, which it does not do for each EU issue. Second, Lochhead has tried
to insert himself into negotiations directly and has cooperated with both the EU and the
UK Government for influence on fisheries (BBC News, October 2013). This means that
his solutions have had to become more like those of a governing party. As a result, Lochhead’s criticism of the EU on fisheries has taken on a more Eurosceptic tone. He has said,
“Many of the problems we have with the current system is ill-fitting regulations imposed on
Scotland by Brussels” (Whitelaw, 2011).
However, there has not been substantive change to the overall pro-Europeanism of
the party because the SNP still acts small and oppositional on overall EU policy. There have
been no changes within the SNP’s internal decision making since gaining a majority. As
such, SNP fisheries policy is still centrally decided. Additionally, Lochhead’s efforts to bypass
the UK Government were not entirely successful. For example, the timing of their consulhttps://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2014/iss1/13
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tation meant they did not have direct influence on decisions (Whitelaw, 2011). As a result
of lack of access, the SNP policy on fisheries continues to be dealt with by MEPs and their
staff which tempers the Eurosceptic language used by Lochhead. MEP Hudghton suggests
that, “The management of Scotland’s fisheries over the past 40 years has been characterized
by uncaring governments in London and an over-centralised approach in Brussels. This latter problem is being addressed to some extent” (Hudghton, 2014). Additionally, the SNP
still aims their discontent with fisheries policy at mainstream parties, not the EU. SNP MP
Angus Robertson argued to the UK Government, “You are right to describe the CFP as
having been a disaster, but you should probably admit and acknowledge that it was a Conservative government that signed us into it in the first place” (Robertson, 2013).
Although SNP fisheries policy has taken on a more Eurosceptic tone, one issue area
is not enough to create nuance to the party’s pro-European policy. If minority nationalist
parties were to grow further, the process by which the SNP has become strongly critical
on CFP could be echoed in more policy areas. However, current growth is not enough.
Only further devolution on the EU could shift minority nationalists from small and oppositional strategy. My argument does imply that members of minority nationalist parties
and EU scholars should not mistake the pro-Europeanism in minority nationalist parties for
inherent Euro-enthusiasm. Size and positioning can change and when they do, they will
change the way in which minority nationalist parties engage with the European Union and
will create internal fissures on the matter. The most imminent possibility for a minority nationalist party to overcome their small and oppositional status is the Scottish independence
referendum in September 2014. This case stands as a test to show what will happen once
the small and oppositional incentives for pro-Europeanism fade. By changing their size and
positioning, independence in Scotland or more devolution of EU policy to Scotland might
alter the trend of minority nationalist pro-Europeanism and finally rattle the SNP’s 35 year
policy of “Independence in Europe.”
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